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Abstract: Conservatism is a political ideology which problematizes change, resists 
modernity and values stability, tradition and order. It emerged in the Enlightenment 
(often in reaction to it), in the work of Hume, Montesquieu, Madison and Burke, but 
its roots go back to Ancient Greek scepticism. 
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Conservatism is a political ideology which problematizes change, resists modernity 
and values stability, tradition and order. It rejects individualism, and focuses instead 
on the health of society and its institutions. Conservative ideas often intersect with the 
politics of religion. In many cases conservatives highlight venerable religious 
institutions as paradigm cases of stabilising elements threatened by innovation and 
social change in society. Equally, they can be suspicious of multiculturalism and other 
forms of internationalism that dilute the importance of place and delegitimise the 
privileging of a particular culture. 
The content of conservatism is a matter of discussion and dispute. For example, (Kirk 
1982: xv-xviii) suggests that conservatives (largely) agree that: (i) there is a 
transcendent (religious) moral order; (ii) social continuity is preferable to rapid, 
radical or revolutionary change; (iii) immemorial usage and tradition is preferable to 
rationalism and new ideas; (iv) political action should be prudent and cautious; 
(v) variety and diverse sources of value are better than universal systems of rights, 
morals or politics; and (vi) people are morally and epistemologically imperfect. 
(Muller 1997: 9-22) gives a similar set of tenets, but argues that although the social 
utility of religion as a set of structures and institutions is important, the radicalising 
tendency of religious ‘enthusiasm’ is regrettable. (O’Hara 2011: 190-201) argues that 
when religious traditions are co-opted by conservatives, their arguments are no longer 
accessible to public reason, and cannot appeal outside the tradition. 
As well as historical studies of conservative thinkers in context, there are more 
philosophical approaches. (Oakeshott 1991) locates conservatism’s core in a rejection 
of rationalist planning. (O’Hara 2011) argues that if conservatism is considered as a 
consistent problematisation of change whose arguments are open to public reason, it is 
best seen as an epistemological ideology. Its major tenets can be derived from the 
knowledge principle, that society is too complex to understand and model accurately, 
and the change principle, that any change to society must be understood as inherently 
risky, so there should be a high burden of proof on an innovator to show that existing 
institutions will not be damaged by change. 
Broadly speaking, conservatives argue that rationalists overestimate both the 
problems of existing societies (Scruton 2010) and their ability to do anything about 
them (Oakeshott 1991). Critics reply that conservatism is at best pessimistic and timid 
(Hayek 1960: 397-411, Hirschman 1991), and at worst a means to protect vested 
interests and rent-seekers from social progress and justice (Honderich 2005). For 
instance, John Randolph (1773-1833) and John C. Calhoun (1782-1850) used 
essentially conservative arguments in the antebellum Southern United States to defend 
its social arrangements, including the practice of slavery (Kirk 1985: 150-184). 
As an ideology concerned with change, the content of conservatism will be different 
across different societies – in other words, it is a positional ideology (Huntington 
1957). Conservatism is often linked directly with the history and geography of a 
particular territory (Scruton 2012: 209-252). A policy may exhibit continuity in one 
society, but may be an innovation elsewhere. However, this entails that conservatives 
from different societies may wish to protect different things. 
Conservatism is also often wrongly conflated with free-market neo-liberalism 
(although in practice, conservatives and neo-liberals often band together against 
common enemies). Yet neo-liberal certainty about free markets’ superiority in 
allocating resources is inconsistent with conservative scepticism and imperfectionism 
(Gray 1995: 87-119, O’Hara 2011: 211-234). Free markets, with their lack of central 
control, are certainly part of the conservative toolkit, but can disrupt social stability; 
neo-liberals who valorise Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) theory of the market often 
neglect his sophisticated social philosophy (Muller 1993). 
Furthermore, because of its journalistic use in quotidian politics, ‘conservative’ has 
become an ambiguous term, whose political meaning is increasingly synonymous 
with ‘right wing’. In the United Kingdom, the largest political party of the right is the 
Conservative Party (which on many occasions has supported radical policies). In the 
United States, ‘conservative’ is a catch-all to denote those opposed to ‘liberals’ 
(another abused ideological term). In many accounts of Islamic fundamentalism, 
people whose views are nothing short of revolutionary are called ‘conservative’ 
(presumably because they hark back to laws and customs formulated several centuries 
ago). 
These various ambiguities encourage hostile commentators to detect incoherence or 
inconsistency, and to demonise conservatism by focusing on its perceived failings. 
Political scientist Robert Eccleshall claims its purpose is to preserve inequalities 
(Eccleshall 2003: 54-55), while philosopher Ted Honderich goes so far as to argue 
that “organized selfishness is the rationale of [conservatives’] politics, and they have 
no other rationale” (Honderich 2005: 302). Such extreme views can be undercut if we 
are alert to the unhelpful use of the label ‘conservative’ to refer to neo-liberals or 
right-wingers indiscriminately. 
Conservatism as a self-conscious view first appeared in the Enlightenment 
(sometimes but not always in reaction against it). Even some of the political 
philosophers of the early Enlightenment, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and 
John Locke (1632-1704), worked to preserve relationships of authority and rights of 
property. David Hume’s (1711-1776) scepticism implied that custom and habit were 
at least as effective as abstract reasoning, while his notion of ‘sympathy’, like Adam 
Smith’s idea of the ‘impartial observer’ providing an internal moral compass, widened 
the scope of moral reasoning from the individual, and socialised it. 
Montesquieu’s (1689-1755) The Spirit of the Laws (1747) was a discussion of how a 
constitution might preserve freedom while restricting radical and dangerous change. 
This proved highly influential during the American Revolution, and its spirit is 
detectable not only in The Federalist Papers (1788) of James Madison (1751-1836) 
and others, but also in the American Constitution itself, which is designed to promote 
prudent discussion and compromise, and inhibit the ability of a majority to impose 
partisan change. Indeed, the Constitution still functions well when its politicians reject 
partisan entrenchment. 
Meanwhile, the radical ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) were absorbed 
by the French Revolutionaries, and the events of 1789 prompted the publication of the 
most influential and representative conservative text, Edmund Burke’s (1729-1797) 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). The Revolution was a key reference 
point; after its consolidation, conservatism diminished into the pessimism of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), the reaction of Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), and the 
futile politicking of the counter-Enlightenment (McMahon 2001). Still, conservatives 
like to contrast the French Revolution (lots of bloodshed, descent into imperialism 
within a decade) with its American equivalent (relatively peaceful, with a lasting 
settlement to the present day). 
Despite its emergence in the Enlightenment, the conservative intuition dates back 
much further, and is strongly connected with philosophical or epistemological 
scepticism (Popkin 2003), from Sextus Empiricus (c.160-210) to Montaigne (1533-
1592). Later conservative thinkers include Matthew Arnold (1822-1888), George 
Santayana (1863-1952), Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), Russell Kirk (1918-1994) 
and Roger Scruton (b.1944). Writers of a conservative disposition include James 
Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851), Joseph Conrad (1857-1924) and T.S. Eliot (1888-
1965). (Kirk 1982) and (Muller 1997) are useful anthologies, while (Kirk 1985) is the 
most comprehensive and readable history. 
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